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The concept of navigability can have a profound influence on the
development of a particular river basin. Mr. Bielefeld begins this
article by reviewing the physical characteristics which are used as the
criteria in determining navigability in the Missouri River Basin, west of
the 98th Meridian. The author then analyzes the incidents which arise
from a finding of navigability and their related effect on specific
instances of cooperation and conflict between the states and federal
government. He concludes the article by examining the rights of
various Indian tribes to federally reserved water in the Basin and their
rights to the ownership of the underlying stream beds.

NAVIGABILITY IN THE
MISSOURI RIVER BASINt
Alvin E. Bielefeld*
W

IREN the United States Supreme Court declared the
New River navigable in 1940,' it was felt by many
that the bars were down and that in the future any stream
which a small boy could not jump across must thereafter be
treated as navigable. The Court held that where a river can
be improved for navigation at a reasonable cost, it must be
treated as navigable.! Justice Roberts, in his dissent,
observed:
If this criterion [of improvability] be the correct one, it is not seen how any stream can be found

not to be navigable. .
t
*

1.
2.
3.

..

'

The views expressed herein are those of the writer and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Department of the Interior or any other agency or
department of the federal government.
Field Solicitor, Department of the Interior, Billings, Montana; A.B. 1930,
J.D. 1933, Northwestern University; Member of the Illinois and Montana
Bar Associations.
United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 421 (1940).
(Hereinafter referred to as the NEW RivEa CASE.)
Id. at 417-418.
Id. at 433.
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This sentiment was echoed by one of our most distinguished
Western courts when it was held that the Moyie River of
Idaho, a stream of modest flow and of considerable gradient,
must be treated as navigable.'
Notwithstanding, an attorney urging the navigability of
a stream should not rely too confidently on Justice Roberts'
views as to the compass of the New River Case. Waterways
are still being held nonnavigable2 Proponents of navigability
would, therefore, do well to follow the conventional, if timeconsuming, course of accumulating proof (1) of historical use
or development for navigation; (2) of present-day use or
development for navigation; and (3) of those physical characteristics of the waterway which demonstrate that the stream
could be adapted to navigation by reasonable improvements.
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF NAVIGABILITY

The physical characteristics which were apparently considered most significant in the New River Case were depth,
4. United States v. Wallace, 157 F. Supp. 931, 933 (D. Idaho 1957).
5. In Utah v. United States, 304 F.2d 23, 26 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 826 (1962), the court held the San Juan River nonnavigable;
noting that the river was unstable and flowed through broad, sandy flood
plains from 1,000 to 5,000 feet wide; that its flow was generally low for
most of the months of the year and had, on occasion, run dry; and that it
had an average slope of more than 7 feet per mile. In United States v.
Ross, 74 F. Supp. 6, 7-8 (D. Mo. 1947), the waterway was held nonnavigable
because it consisted of a barrow pit created by digging dirt for a levee.
During dry seasons there was no water in the passage. In Iowa-Wisconsin
Bridge Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 852, 866 (Ct. Cl. 1949), waterways
were held nonnavigable because they were little more than sloughs which
the Mississippi River filled at high water. The court observed that the
sloughs could serve no public purpose in the interest of commerce. But the
court noted that a log-floating stream in a logging community might be
navigable although actual boating was impossible and that the same was
true of shallow streams used to carry the produce of the country to market.
The court also stated: "In States where fishing and hunting are of
importance, streams habitually used by the public for that purpose have
been held public waters." In re Builders' Supply Co., 278 F. Supp. 254, 256
(N.D. Iowa 1968) held that Clear Lake in Iowa was nonnavigable because
it was only "a small landlocked lake without any coalescing waterways,
streams or other watercourse." In Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 147
(Wyo. 1961) the North Platte River was held to be nonnavigable, notwithstanding an average July flow of 1308 cubic feet per second and use of
the waterway for pleasure craft and logging. The court observed that the
waters were "unsuited for navigation in interstate or international commerce and are not of such economic value for transportation as justifies
their being classified as navigable waters." In State v. Adams, 251 Minn.
521, 89 N.W.2d 661, 672 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 826 (1958), the
waterways held nonnavigable were a ten-mile chain of six lakes of depths
varying from zero to 40 feet, connected by short stretches of stream. The
connecting sections of stream were variously described as "man-made," as a
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volume of flow, and gradient.' The existence of rapids and
falls,7 high canyon walls,' and the extent of the iced-over
period' may also be significant, but since these physical
characteristics are not always present, their importance is
more difficult to measure and compare.
If we compare the average depth, flow and gradient of
the New River with like characteristics of other streams held
to be navigable since the New River decision, it will be seen
that the courts still require that a navigable stream be of some
consequence. A comparison of these characteristics follows:
River

Va.' 0

New River, W.
Susquehanna, Pa."
Oconee, Ga.12

Upper Mo., Mont.' 3
Moyie, Ida. 4
Big Horn, Mont. 15

Average
Depth

Average
Flow

inches to 6 ft.
substantial
3 ft.

3,211 c.f.s.
33,000 c.f.s.
3,600 c.f.s.

1.4 to 2.5 ft.
6 in. to 7/2 ft.
4 to 10 ft.

4,015 c.f.s.
857 c.f.s.
3,850 c.f.s.

Average
Gradient

5 to 8 ft.
4 ft.
1 ft.
4.6 ft.
17 ft.
6.83 ft.

By way of contrast, it should be noted that in considering the
navigability of the Genesee River above Rochester, New York,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that evidence
of an average flow of 1600 cubic feet per second and a gradient

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.

"watery cul-de-sac" leading nowhere, a stream four feet wide and 1.1 feet
deep, and as a stream capable of passing through two 18-inch culverts. In
Monroe v. State, 111 Utah 1, 175 P.2d 759, 760-761 (1946), the waterway
held nonnavigable was a natural lake, covering 580 acres, so located that
it was "easier to go around it than to cross it." It had been referred to as
a swamp and periodically went dry.
Supra note 1, at 410-413.
Supra note 1, at 412. Here rapids or falls of 8, 9 and 11% feet did not
preclude a finding of navigability.
Utah v. United States, supra note 5, at 26. Here the encasing of the stream
by rocky cliffs and steep slopes was held to be one of several conditions
precluding a finding of navigability.
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 84 (1931). Here periodic icing of the
river was held not to preclude navigability.
Data taken from United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 23 F. Supp.
83, 90 (W.D. Va. 1938) ; 107 F.2d 769, 781 and 800 (4th Cir. 1939).
Data taken from Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 123 F.2d 155,
161 (D.C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 806 (1942).
Data taken from Georgia Power Co. v. FPC, 152 F.2d 908, 910-911 (5th
Cir. 1946).
Data is for upstream portion of river area held navigable and is taken
from pp. 18 and 19 of Federal Power Commission Opinion No. 170 (November 30, 1948). In Re Montana Power Co., Docket No. IT-5840. Navigability
affirmed in Montana Power Co. v. FPC, 185 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 947 (1951).
Data taken from report of Regional Director, Bureau of Reclamation,
Boise, Idaho, dated March 31, 1958. Navigability decreed in United States
V. Wallace, supra note 4.
Data taken from affidavit of Bureau of Reclamation Hydrologist Phil
Q. Gibbs, dated July 31, 1961 and filed in The Crow Tribe of Indians v.
United States, Civil No. 214 (D. Mont. 1961), in which navigability was
decreed Oct. 1, 1963.
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of 3.9 feet per mile was not sufficient, by itself, to establish

navigability, particularly since one 42-mile stretch of the
stream had a gradient of 10.5 feet per mile."s The court said:
[F]lows and gradients alone do not demonstrate the
physical eligibility of a river for reasonable improvement. One also needs to know widths, depths, contours, velocities, and similar characteristics which do
not appear anywhere in the evidence.' 7

In the two most contested hearings on the navigability of
waters in the Missouri River Basin," the courts received
considerable evidence on the historical and present-day use
and development of the streams for navigation, as well as

abundant data on the physical characteristics of the streams.
In reviewing the evidence on the navigability of the
Upper Missouri, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia seemed impressed by the evidence of historical use
of the waterway. But the court also noted:
The power of Congress over commerce is not
to be hampered because of the necessity for reasonable improvements to make an interstate waterway
available for traffic." Of course, improvements
which might be reasonable in an urban industrial
area might be out of the question in a sparsely
settled region. But we do not think that factors of
economic geography, such as density of population
and concentration of industry, may remove an otherwise navigable stream from the reach of federal
16. Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v. FPC, 344 F.2d 594, 598-599 (2nd Cir.
1965); cert. denied, 382 U.S. 832 (1965).
17. Id. at 599. The 42-mile stretch of the Genesee with a 10.5-foot gradient
might be compared with the 6.4-mile stretch of the Wisconsin River. This
6.4-mile stretch had an 18-foot gradient but this did not prevent a finding
of navigability of the Wisconsin River. Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. FPC,
147 F.2d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 880 (1945). Similarly, a 17-mile stretch of the Great Falls of the Missouri River, with a
gradient of 30 feet, did not prevent a determination that the Upper Missouri
River, which included it, was navigable. Montana Power Co. v. FPC, 185
F.2d 491, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 947 (1951). The
difference between Rochester and the last two cases might be that in the
last two cases the Federal Power Commission submitted its conventional
showing of navigability, whereas in Rochester it relied on data attached to
the Power Company's petition and on matter not in the record.
18. The Upper Missouri River's navigability was contested in the Federal Power
Commission hearing confirmed in Montana Power Co. v. FPC, supra note 17.
The Big Horn River's navigability was contested in The Crow Tribe of
Indians of Montana v. United States, supra note 15. In Rutten v. State, 93
N.W.2d 796 (N.D. 1958), the navigability of Devils Lake in North Dakota
was conceded by both parties. In Coates v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 471,
472 (Ct. Cl. 1953) the claim of the plaintiffs that the Missouri was not
navigable in St. Charles County, Missouri, seems not to have been seriously
pressed. The river was found navigable as a fact.
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power. If the stream's flow, depth, gradient, width
and capacity make it 'suitable for use' in interstate
commerce, it is subject to the licensing authority of
the Federal Power Commission. Even if such a
stream is never actually used for transportation,
there is no doubt that it may be necessary to use it
for flood control, watershed development, regulation
of the navigable capacity of the portions of the river
actually used for transportation, etc. 9
In reviewing the evidence on the navigability of the Big
Horn River, the District Court for the Eastern Division of
Montana noted a marked conflict in the evidence of historical
use and in the practicablty of present-day navigation, but
emphasized that the river could be made navigable. The court
said:
A qualified hydrologist, in an affidavit received
in evidence, expressed his opinion that the river
could, with relatively little cost and work, be made
navigable both up and downstream by the removal of
some 150 boulders and by building some small locks.
There was further evidence of many persons who
have 'shot the rapids' through the canyon in recent
years, testifying to the easy passage and pleasant
voyage.
There is no way to reconcile the opinions of the
various persons whose affidavits were taken. In the
opinion of oldtimers the river is treacherous and
dangerous, and navigating it through the canyon is
fraught with danger. Furthermore, the heavy silt
content builds up sand bars so rapidly that channels
change, causing further navigation problems. On the
other hand, the affidavits of weekend pleasure seekers who traveled down the river in all manner of
boats testify to the easy and pleasant passage which
the trip allows.
In any event, it is clear from the evidence that
the river could be made navigable. Although for
certain parts of the year it might be impassable because of ice, it is well settled that this fact alone will
not prevent navigability; nor will the presence of
sand bars. U.S. v. Appalachian Power Co., 1940,
311 U.S. 377, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243; Economy
Light & Power Co. v. United States, 1921, 256 U.S.
113, 41 S.Ct. 409, 65 L.Ed. 847. Thus in the Appa19. Montana Power Co. v. FPC, supra note 17, at 491.
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lachian case it was said in 311 U.S. at 408-409:
"There has never been doubt that the navigability
referred to in the cases was navigability despite the
obstruction of falls, rapids, sand bars, carries or
shifting currents." And in the Economy Light &
Power case, in 256 U.S. at 122 the Court said: "Navigability, in the sense of the law, is not destroyed
because the watercourse is interrupted by occasional
natural obstructions or portages; nor need the navigation be open at all seasons of the year, or at all
stages of the water."
The physical characteristics of the river do not
prevent its classification as navigable ....
Many stretches of water in the Missouri River Basin, on
which no definitive determinations of navigability have yet
been made, have physical characteristics which compare with
those of waters which have been held navigable since the New
River Case." On these, we may expect adjudications whenever the incidents of navigability become important to public
or private interests.
INCIDENTS OF NAVIGABILITY

The most familiar incidents of navigability are the commerce servitude and state ownership of the bed of the waterway. The commerce servitude, of course, will mean different
things to different parties and interests. To the ordinary
citizen it means that the waterway subject to the servitude is
a public highway" upon which he has a right of transit for
himself and his goods; and upon which he may hunt and fish
2
without hindrance by the riparian owner. And to the boat
Crow Tribe of Indians of Montana v. United States, supra note 15, Opinion
of Judge W. J. Jameson, dated October 1, 1963, at pp. 35 and 36.
21. The navigability of the upper reaches of the Yellowstone River, which at
one time had considerable traffic, had not been adjudicated or Congressionally designated as either navigable or nonnavigable. See 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1
to 59a. The same is true of the upper reaches of the Big Horn River.
The Jefferson, the Madison, the Big Hole, the Clarks Fork of the Yellowstone, the Wind, the Shoshone and the Niobrara Rivers each have average
annual flows approximating one million acre-feet; however, none of the
latter have rates of flow exceeding 2200 cubic feet per second.
22. Section 12 of the Act of March 3, 1811, (33 U.S.C.A., § 10, 2 Stat. 662, 666)
provided that all navigable rivers and waters of the Louisiana Purchase
"shall be and forever remain public highways."
23. Historically, all citizens have had the right to fish in navigable waters.
Grimes Packing Co. v. Hynes, 67 F. Supp. 43 (D.C. Alas. 1946); af'd 165
F.2d 323 (9th Cir. 1947); Ne-Bo-Shone Ass'n v. Hogarth, 81 F.2d 70 (6th
Cir. 1936). However, in Day v. Armstrong, supra note 5, the Wyoming
Supreme Court held that navigability was not essential to assure a public
right to float a waterway for fishing purposes. And see State v. Red
20.
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owner it may mean a limitation on liability for boating accidents, but also the need to observe the admiralty and maritime
rules of navigation.2 4 To the riparian owner and the enterpriser it may mean much more. It may mean that benefits
created by proximity to the stream can be denied the riparian
owner without compensation. 5 It may mean that the enterpriser requiring the flow of the stream or a particular water
elevation may be denied his needs or required to operate under
a federal license. 6
To the State, ownership of the bed of the waterway may
provide a new source of revenue, 7 or a resource that can be
pledged in joint state and federal development.2 8 At the same

24.
25.

26.

27.

28.

River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945). The public dilemma,
where floatable waterways are held to be nonnavigable, is nicely pointed
up by Robert I. Reis in Policy and Planning for Recreational Use of Inland
Waters, 40 Temp. L. Q. 155 (1967).
Loc-Wood Boat & Motors v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1957) ; In re
Builders' Supply Co., supra note 5; In re River Queen, 275 F. Supp. 403
(W.D. Ark. 1967); Madole v. Johnson, 241 F. Supp. 379 (W.D. La. 1965).
Values of the fast lands for power site purposes may be taken for commerce
purposes without compensation. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350
U.S. 222 (1956). The average level of the waterway may be raised and
maintained, at least to high water mark, without entitling the riparian
owner to compensation for consequent loss. United States v. Willow River
Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945); Borough of Ford City v. United States,
345 F.2d 645 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 903 (1965). The riparian
owner's access to the waterway may be cut off without compensation.
United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386 (1945); Sherrill v. United
States, 381 F.2d 744 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
In recent years, some of the most serious contests on navigability have
involved a Federal Power Commission order directing the actual or prospective water user to secure or comply with a federal license. United States v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., supra note 1; Pennsylvania Water & Power
Co. v. FPC, supra note 11; Georgia Power Co. v. FPC, supra note 12;
Montana Power Co. v. FPC, upra note 13; Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v.
FPC, supra note 16; Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. FPC, supra note 17;
Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 125 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1942); Wisconsin v. FPC, 214 F.2d 334 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 883 (1954);
Citizens' Util. Co. v. FPC, 279 F.2d 1 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 893
(1960). The bridge builder will also require an Army license. General
Bridges Act of 1946 (33 U.S.C. § 525 et seq. (1964)). And the riparian
owner who wishes to fill in waterfront land may be required to secure a
determination as to navigability and a license from the Army before proceeding. Tatum v. Blackstock, 319 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1963).
Renewed oil and gas activity within the Missouri River Basin has multiplied
the occasions on which determinations as to the ownership of river and
lake beds must be made. While the States' ownership of the beds of navigable waterways is generally conceded, the meandering of the Missouri
River and its tributaries permits continuing challenge as to what land lies
within a waterway's bed.
Under the Federal Water Project Recreation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-70, 79
Stat. 213 (1965), state and local agencies are obliged to contribute with
property and funds to any large-scale recreational development initiated
by federal agencies. State ownership of the beds of critical waterway sites
permits a contribution and participation that will assure important recreational development. Typical of this situation is the planned donation of
state lands within the flowage area of the navigable Devils Lake complex
for the gigantic federal and state program for the restoration of Devils
Lake which was authorized by the Garrison Unit Act of August 5, 1965,
Pub. L. No. 89-108, 79 Stat. 433.
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time, the State may find that imposition of the navigation
servitude limits state control over the use of the affected
waters.2 9
THE SPECIAL CLIMATE OF THE MISSOulI RIVER BASIN

In the Missouri River Basin, the consequences of navigability will not be quite the same as in other major drainage
areas. This is not only because of geography" but because of
the applicable laws.
In the Missouri River Basin, the principal authorization
for water resource development continues to be Section 9 of
the Flood Control Act of December 22, 1944."' Section 9
authorized the Pick-Sloan plan for the integrated uses of the
water resources of the Missouri River Basin. "2 Under the
Pick-Sloan plan, the Corps was to be responsible for constructing the mainstem reservoirs on the Missouri River ;"
and was also to have responsibility for all flood control and
navigation operations in the Basin. The Bureau of Reclamation was to be responsible for constructing the tributary reservoirs, except those to be used primarily for flood control, and
also to have responsibility for all reclamation and power
developments in the Basin.3 4 The Bureau's prosecution of
29. See Trelease, Water Rights of Various Levels of Government--States' Rights
v. National Powers, 19 Wyo. L.J. 189 (1965). Dean Trelease has nicely
pointed up the areas where conflicts and injustices could occur. One purpose
of this article is to consider whether such areas have been or can be delimited
in the Missouri River Basin.
30. The Missouri River is the longest continuous waterway in the world. Space
and topography are also critical resources. The insulation of plains and
mountains makes the Missouri River Basin the national redoubt in which,
in the event of atomic holocaust, the Nation's resources can be re-marshaled.
This circumstance offers special reason for the most prudent development
of the Basin's water resources.
31. 58 Stat. 887.
32. Colonel Lewis A. Pick authored the Corps of Engineers' plan for water
resource development in the Missouri River Basin. This plan is found in
H.R. Doc. No. 475, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944). W. G. Sloan authored the
Bureau of Reclamation's plan for water resource development in the
Missouri River Basin. This plan is found in S. Doc. No. 191, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1944). The two plans were integrated into one plan by agreements
between the two federal agencies which were set out in S. Doc. No. 247, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1944) and which we identify as "The Pick-Sloan Plan."
An excellent history of the plan is provided in Marian E. Ridgeway's, THE
MIssouRI RIvER BASIN'S PICK-SLOAN PLAN (Univ. Ill. Press, 1955).
33. S. Doc. No. 191, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 & 7 (1944) and S. Doc. No. 247,
78th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1944). The mainstem reservoirs included Fort Peck
in Montana, which was nearing completion in 1944, Garrison in North
Dakota, and Oahe, Big Bend, Fort Randall and Gavins Point in South
Dakota.
34. Id. Section 9(c) of the Flood Control Act of December 22, 1944, 58 Stat.
887-891, reads as follows:
(c) Subject to the basin-wide findings and recommendations regarding the benefits, the allocations of costs and the repayments by
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the reclamation and power development in the Missouri River
Basin was to be governed by the Reclamation laws. 5 This
means that Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of June 17,
19026 was for application and that state laws and regulations
respecting the acquisition of water rights would be followed
to the extent that the laws and regulations did not frustrate
the Congressionally endorsed plans for project development. 7
Accordingly, and pursuant to precedent," the Bureau of
Reclamation has complied with state laws on the appropria-

35.
36.

37.

38.

water users, made in said House and Senate documents, the reclamation
and power developments to be undertaken by the Secretary of the
Interior under said plans shall be governed by the Federal Reclamation
Laws (Act of June 17, 1902, 32 Stat. 388, and Acts amendatory thereof
or supplementary thereto), except that irrigation of Indian trust and
tribal lands, and repayment therefor, shall be in accordance with the
laws relating to Indian lands.
Thus, with respect to the Missouri River Basin Project, authority for the
control and disposition of water and power, is exclusively provided by
Section 9 of the Flood Control Act of December 22, 1944, supra, and no
reliance need or can be had on Sections 5, 6, 7 & 8 of that Act. This unique
circumstance of having specific authorizations for one project, while general
authorizations were provided for other projects covered by the same legislation, was occasioned by the Pick-Sloan "marriage" (note 32). The Sloan
plan for the Missouri River Basin Project was originally proposed for
authorization in a one-project bill, S. 1915, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944),
which would normally have been reported out by the Senate Committee on
Irrigation and Reclamation. When the "marriage" was effected, S. 1915
with some madification, was incorporated by the House Committee on Flood
Control as a special provision (Sec. 9) in H.R. 4485, 78th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1944) which became the Flood Control Act of December 22, 1944, supra.
Repeated Congressional recognition of the fact that Section 5 of the Flood
Control Act of December 22, 1944, supra, was not applicable to the Missouri
River Basin Project was noted in the statement of Assistant Solicitor
Edward Weinberg in the Joint Hearings on Missouri Basin Water Problems
Before the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and the Committee on Public Works, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 347-352 (1957).
Id.
43 U.S.C.A. 383, 32 Stat. 388, 390, Section 8 reads:
That nothing in this Act shall be construed as affecting or intended
to affect or to in any way interfere with the laws of any State or
Territory relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of
water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereunder, and
the Secretary of the Interior, in carrying out the provisions of this Act,
shall proceed in conformity with such laws, and nothing herein shall
in any way affect any right of any State or of the Federal Government
or of any landowner, appropriator, or user of water in, to, or from any
interstate stream or the waters thereof: Provided, That the right to the
use of water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure, and the limit of the right.
Turner v. Kings River Conservation Dist., 360 F.2d 184, 198 (9th Cir. 1966).
Justice Browning's caveat was, " 'reason precludes an interpretation of the
general provisions of Section 8 of the Reclamation Act [of 1902] . . . which
would impute to Congress an intention to frustrate its plans for this project
by subjecting it to the risk that it might never be used for some of the
authorized purposes, should a state permit not be forthcoming."'
Justice Douglas' separate opinion in United States v. Gerlach Live Stock
Co., 339 U.S. 725, 760 (1950), notes the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Reclamation's statement "taht it has been the almost invariable practice of
the Bureau to file notices of appropriations under state law without regard
to whether the stream involved was navigable or nonnavigable."
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tion of water"0 or has relied on state laws which recognized
the creation of a water right by the diversion or impoundment
of water and the application of the same to beneficial use,' "
or by the construction of works." This circumstance appears
to have removed one of the principal occasions for conflict
between state and federal authorities in the use and control
of navigable waters in the Basin.
Too, the northern portion of the Missouri River Basin
has been blessed by the fact that the most substantial federal
impoundments and diversions have occurred where there was
a surplus of water, 2 or an absence of use for other than
navigation purposes.4" The federal impoundments and diversions thus did not limit or impair the exercise of vested
water rights.
Possible areas of conflict between navigation uses and
upstream uses for irrigation and other consumptive uses have
also been fairly well contained by the O'Mahoney-Millikin
Amendment set out in Section 1 (b) of the Flood Control Act
39. In North Dakota the United States filed and had approved a water right
application for 3,145,000 acre-feet of the waters of the Missouri, Souris,
Sheyenne and James Rivers for use in connection with the Garrison Diversion Unit of the Missouri River Basin Project. This is believed to be the
largest water right application in Basin history. In other Basin states
where statutes prescribe exclusive procedures for making water right appropriations, such procedures have been followed by the Bureau of Reclamation.
40. In Montana a water right may be perfected by following the statutory procedures set out in MONT. REV. CODE §§ 89-808 to 812 (1947); or by the
construction of diversion or impoundment works, followed by the application
of the captured water to beneficial use. Bailey v. Tintinger, 45 Mont. 154,
122 P. 575, 581 (1912). The statutory procedure has been followed bythe
Bureau of Reclamation on all of its projects except the Canyon Ferry Unit.
On the Canyon Ferry Unit and on the Fort Peck Project of the Corps of
Engineers, the alternate procedure recorgnized by Bailey was followed.
41. In South Dakota, Section 61.0106 of the South Dakota Code, as amended in
1955, validates all vested rights which are defined in Section 61.0102(7) (c)
as "The right to take and use water for beneficial purposes where a riparian
owner is engaged in the construction of works for the actual application of
water to a beneficial use at the time of the passage of this chapter [March
2, 1955), provided such works shall be completed and water is actually
applied for such use within a reasonable time thereafter." On March 2,
1955, the United States was a principal riparian owner on the Missouri
River and the mainstem reservoirs of the Missouri River Basin Project,
with their appurtenant power generating facilities, were under construction, so that the government's right to the use of the Missouri River waters
now enjoys state validation.
42. The Fort Peek, Yellowtail and Canyon Ferry reservoirs in Montana were
happily located where high water was little used and rarely welcomed.
43. The mainstem reservoirs were constructed in North and South Dakota when
irrigation or municipal and industrial uses of Missouri River water were
minimal, although full development
almost nonexistent. Such uses are still
of the million-acre Garrison Diversion Unit in North Dakota and the half
should eventually produce substanin
South
Dakota
Oahe
Unit
million-acre
tial demands on Missouri River water.
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of December 22, 1944." This amendment stipulated that west
of the 98th Meridian the uses of water for navigation would
be subordinate to beneficial consumptive uses for domestic,
municipal, stock watering, irrigation, mining or industrial
purposes." One question that has arisen in connection with
this amendment has been whether the use of water for power
generation can be treated as a consumptive use entitled to
preference over uses for navigation. An affirmative answer
to the question has been urged on behalf of the Upper Missouri Basin power users.'" A negative answer has been urged
on behalf of the Mississippi Valley Association." Final resolution of the question has been obviated by wet weather. The
increased stream flows in the last few years have permitted
an adequate hydro-electric generating schedule, without
reduction in the late summer releases on which the downstream shippers rely. In the future, electrical interties now
under construction, as well as the increasing development of
steam generation in the Basin, should permit even more
flexible generating schedules so that waters needed for navigation need not be untimely released for the making of electric
energy.
Sections 1(a) and 1(c) of the Flood Control Act of
December 22, 194448 also permit the state agencies to have a
say in the federal water resource planning. Under Sections
1(a) and 1(c) the water resource investigations and planning
of the Corps of Engineers and of the Bureau of Reclamation
must be conducted in such a manner as to keep the affected
state or states informed as to progress. State comment and
state consultationsare encouraged during the preparation of
the report. When the federal report is completed, it must be
submitted to the affected state or states for final comment.
Any state objection to the report must then be submitted to
and aired before the appropriate Congressional committees
prior to any further advancing of the plans. And even after
33 U.S.C. 701-1 (1964), 58 Stat. 887.
It is recognized that the O'Mahoney-Millildn Amendment is applicable in
other western river basins. However, its significance in the Missouri River
Basin would appear to be more marked since here river navigation is a
major industry.
46. WISE & POTAMKIN, UPPER MISSOURI BASIN WATER RIGHTS, 86th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Comm. Print, 1960).
47. SMITH & GAGE, MIssouRi BASIN WATER RIGHTS, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm.
Print, 1961).
48. 58 Stat. 887.
44.
45.
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Congressional authorization, a state objection can be entertained. 9 Thus, from the time a water resource development
is first thought about, Sections 1(a) and 1(c) permit and
require federal-state cooperation in shaping its conception.
Additionally, in the Missouri River Basin, Congress has
established a unique arrangement under which Missouri River
Basin Project construction funds may be expended through
or in cooperation with state agencies." This arrangement has
made it possible to enlist the states and their political subdivisions as partners in several important areas of project
development. Typical of these partnership arrangements are
settlement studies in which the best use of project soil and
water resources are determined; relocation agreements affecting roads and public facilities; programs for the development
and management of the littoral lands of reservoirs; and actual
participation in minor construction and drainage work."
Needless to say, the state's participation in both the
planning and development of the Missouri River Basin Project has assured a community of interest that resolves many
problems in federal-state relationships which could otherwise
be troublesome.
Notwithstanding, the several devices which the Congress
has provided for the accommodation of conflicting interests
in the Missouri River Basin's water resource development
cannot be expected wholly to remove occasions for conflict
among the federal, state and other agencies.
49. In the case of the Moorehead Unit in Montana, the objections of upstream
ranchers in Wyoming were sufficient to halt construction, even though
Congress, in the Act of July 31, 1947 (61 Stat. 695, 699) had already appropriated funds for commencing construction of the dam as an emergency
flood control project.
50. The very first appropriation for the Missouri River Basin Project provided that the appropriation could be expended "either independently or
through or in cooperation with existing Federal and State agencies." See
the Interior Department Appropriation Act of 1946 (59 Stat. 318, 343).
Substantially the same language has been included in all succeeding appropriation acts. The administrative provisions for the Bureau of Reclamation
contained in the Public Works Act of 1969 (82 Stat. 705, 711) still provides:
Allotments to the Missouri River Basin project from the appropriation under the head 'Construction and Rehabilitation' . . . may be
expended through or in cooperation with State and other Federal
agencies, and advances to such agencies are hereby authorized.
51. The Act of June 13, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-575, 70 Stat. 274, later permitted
local organizations in all of the Reclamation area to perform drainage and
minor completion work for projects on which they had made a commitment
to repay costs. But this authorization still lacwked the-bi-dtlil-ofthe- Missouri
River Basin authorization.
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One circumstance which can create problems is the enormous size of many of the federal impoundments and diversions
in the Missouri River Basin. Thus, in South Dakota, the
federal right to the use of Missouri River waters for power
generation is such that in 45 out of 50 years no appropriator
junior to the federal government can expect to divert water
without impairment of the government right. The significance of this impairment is most appreciable upstream from
the Oahe dam, where non-federal diversions are most likely
because of the limited rainfall. In this area, the diversion
of one acre-foot of water has the consequence of depriving
the government of four acre-feet of water. This is because
the one acre-foot of water, if it had not been diverted, would
have activated four generating plants downstream.2 The loss
in power revenues would, of course, be affected by the extent
to which the diversion reduced the hydraulic head above the
generators. But the minimum loss is quite likely to approximate two dollars per acre-foot. Thus, if the diversions were
substantial, the payout and financial feasibility of the Missouri River Basin Project would be reduced. 3 In this situation, federal officials are obliged to urge that junior appropriators who intrude on the federal right, and particularly
those who propose to divert from the federal reservoirs themselves, contract to compensate the government for the loss
which the diversion will occasion. This requirement for a
diversion contract might make it appear that the federal
officials, rather than state officials, control the diversion of
water. And some resentment has been expressed. In actual
fact, the federal officials are exercising the goverment water
right in the same manner in which a private party would
exercise his water right. Under the laws of most of the Upper
Basin states, an impounder or diverter of water who captures
water surplus to his needs is permitted and, in fact, required
to sell his surplus to any party needing it for beneficial use. "4
52. At Oahe, Big Bend, Fort Randall and Gavins Point dams.
53. Some two-thirds of the $5,838,946,000 estimated cost of the Missouri River
Basin Project is reimbursable. The portion of this amount to be repaid from
power revenues exceeds three billion dollars. Hearings on H.R. 1003, H.R.
1013, and H.R. 9046 Before the Subcomm. on Irrigation and Reclamation of
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 17,
at 252 (1964).
54. S.D. CODE § 61.0121 (Supp. 1960); N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-23 (Supp.
1967); NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-273 (1943); MONT. REV. CODE § 89-823 (1947);
WYo. STAT. § 41-39 (1957). And see Lake De Smet Reservoir Company v.
Kaufmann, 75 Wyo. 87, 292 P.2d 482 (1956). In 2 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND
WATER RIGHTS, 1484-1485 (2d Ed. 1912), Mr. Kinney goes so far as to say:
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The difference is that the federal rights, just as the federal
needs, are so large in comparison to the private rights.5
Another area in which the size of the federal impoundment has caused some concern is that relating to the quantum
of the reservoir right. Normally, and where the state statute
or the water right permit itself does not otherwise provide, a
reservoir right "is measured by the quantity of water it will
hold at one filling.""6 Where the reservoir is small, "the
quantity of water it will hold at one filling," may be an inconsiderable draft on the stream. But where the reservoir or
reservoirs are sufficient to capture the entire flow of a river
the size of the Missouri River, the water left for subsequent
appropriators is likely to be minimal. In this situation, one
state official has suggested that the quantity of water annually
accruing under a reservoir right should be that quantity
necessary to complete the filling of the reservoir as of a
specified date, which presumably would be the opening date
of the irrigation season. In other words, the reservoir right
would be an annual "topping-off right," which would be
measured by reservoir capacity minus holdover storage impounded as of the "measuring date." Thus, in a particular
year, if the reservoir operator, on the "measuring date," were
fortunate or careful enough to have a reservoir completely
filled with holdover storage, he would be entitled to make no
draft on the stream for that year. Under such a rule, obviously, the value of a storage facility would be minimized and
After water has been once stored in reservoirs, it becomes personal
property, and may be sold, contracted for, and disposed of as such
property. It is protected in such reservoirs by the statutes of the
various States, providing that the stealing of water from a canal, ditch,
or other works is a criminal offense, and also providing for the punishment therefor.
Notwithstanding, recent "natural flow" appropriators who propose diverting
from mainstem reservoirs have vigorously challenged the government's right
to charge for the water diverted. Such challenge ignored the fact that even
with a prior and superior right, the "natural flow" diversions would have
been infeasible without the reservoirs. The reservoirs not only reduced the
required pump lifts by as much as 200 feet, but clarified and stabilized the
flows.
55. However, even on one of the smaller impoundments of the Bureau of Sports
Fisheries and Wildlife, the government has been obliged to protest the
issuance of permits by state officials for private irrigation diversions from
the federal reservoir itself.
56. Windsor Reservoir & Canal Co. v. Lake Supply Ditch Co., 44 Colo. 214, 98
Pac. 729, 734 (1908) ; N. Sterling Irrigation Dist. v. Riverside Reservoir
& Land Co., 119 Colo. 50, 200 P.2d 933, 935 (1948); 1 WIEL, WATER RIGHTS,
411 (3d Ed. 1911); 2 KINNEY, IRRIGATION AND WATER RIGHTS, 1478 (2d Ed.
1912). And see Federal Land Bank v. Morris, 112 Mont. 445, 116 P.2d 1007,
1011-1012, where the court holds that a reservoir operator is entitled to one
filling of the reservoir "up to its capacity" but was also entitled additionally
to any water "that would otherwise go to waste."
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the reservoir operator would have compelling reason to dispose of as much of his holdover storage as possible before
the "measuring date." The consequent penalizing of careful
water conservation and the encouragement of wasteful use
seems plain.
A more significant consequence of any acceptance of a
"topping-off rule" would be its effect on the states where
the mainstem reservoirs are located. Under an interstate
adjudication involving equitable apportionment, water not
assigned to existing storage or natural flow rights in one
state would presumably be available for use in other states
of the drainage area.5 7 Upstream states with a concentration
of large reservoirs and even states downstream from the
mainstem reservoirs would thus profit from the "topping-off
rule." This circumstance should, accordingly, limit advocacy
of such a rule in the mainstem reservoir states. The consequence of such a rule on the reasonable operation of a multipurpose reservoir" should also make federal support for the
rule unlikely. Thus, insofar as quantification of a reservoir
right is concerned, avoidance of any real occasion for state
and federal conflict can be expected.
One other unique condition that has created interesting
legal questions in the administration of navigable waters of
the Missouri River Basin is the Indian interest in such waters.
A little over a hundred and thirty years ago, most of the
Missouri River Basin was designated as "The Indian Country."5 Today, some fifteen Indian reservations abut on the
Missouri River or on one of its tributaries."° The rights of
the Indians on such reservations to the use of the Basin
waters and to the beds of the streams are still being measured.
2 CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, § 132.4 (1967).
58. The deep drawdown which would be dictated by the inability to replace
storage water would work havoc on irrigation pumping from the reservoir,
on power generation which depends on an adequate head, and on recreation
which cannot tolerate a violent fluctuation in the shoreline.
59. Act of June 30, 1834, § 1 (4 Stat. 729). Only the State of Missouri was
excluded.
60. The Blackfeet Reservation (Marias R.); the Fort Belknap Reservation
(Milk R.); the Wind River Reservation (Wind R.); the Crow Reservation
(Big Horn R.); the Northern Cheyenne Reservation (Tongue R.); the
Fort Peck Reservation (Missouri R.); the Fort Berthold Reservation (Missouri R.); the Standing Rock Reservation (Missouri R.); the Cheyenne
River Reservation (Cheyenne and Missouri R.); the Pine Ridge Reservation
(Cheyenne R.); the Crow Creek Reservation (Missouri R.); the Rosebud
Reservation (Missouri R.); the Yankton Reservation (Missouri R.); the
Ponca Reservation (Missouri R.); and the Santee-Sioux Reservation
(Missouri R.).

57.
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Sixty years ago, in Winters v. United States,"' the
Supreme Court of the United States held that the Indians of
the Fort Belknap Reservation of Montana had a reserved
right to use as much water of the Milk River of the Missouri
River Basin as was necessary to serve the irrigable lands of
the reservation. This reserved right, even though unexercised, was to enjoy a continuing priority as of the date the
reservation was established. This "Winters' doctrine" came
to be recognized as applicable to substantially all of the Indian
reservations."2 The doctrine played an important part in the
evolution of the federal reserved water doctrine."
While the federal reserved water doctrine may seem formidable today,6" the application of the Winters' doctrine in
the Missouri River Basin appears not to have appreciably
impeded water resource development. This was not because
Indian irrigation projects were not energetically advanced,
but because the availability of water, particularly where the
supply was enhanced by adequate storage,65 was sufficient
for all irrigation needs, whether Indian or non-Indian.
However, with the emergence of the petro-chemical and
other water-using industries and their accelerating interest
in the mineral resources of the Missouri River Basin, 66 it

became apparent that the demand for water was going to
increase markedly. The enlarged demand for water, and its
more sophisticated use, meant that a higher price could be
exacted for its use. 7 In this situation, representatives of the
61. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
62. See supra note 57, ch. 10.
63. Veeder, The Pelton Decision: A symbl--A Guaranty that the Development
and Conservation of our Nation's Resources Will Keep Pace With our
National Demands, 27 MONT. L. REV. 27, 29 (1965). And see Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
64. Comment, The Federal Reserved Water Doctrine-Applicationto the Problem of Water for Oil Shale Development, 3 LAND & WATER L. REV. 75 (1968).
65. Heretofore, representatives of the Indian interests appeared to recognize
that Winters' Decree rights did not extend to "developed waters" which nonIndian interests had made available by the construction of storage or pumping works and which would not be available for use without such works.
66. The last great coal and lignite reserves are concentrated in North Dakota,
Montana and Wyoming. These happily coexist with adequate water supplies.
Apart from surface run-off, there are several billion acre-feet of ground
water underlying the Missouri River Basin states. See, Remarks by J.
Cordell Moore, Assistant Secretary Mineral Resources, Department of the
Interior, before the Missouri Basin Field Committee, Glacier National Park,
August 21, 1968, on file Interior Missouri Basin Field Committee, Billings,
Montana.
67. In S. Doc. No. 191, supra note 33, an appropriate price for domestic and
industrial water was estimated to be 10 cents per thousand gallons which
would result in a charge of $32.58 per acre-foot.
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Indian Tribes began increasingly to insist that Indian rights
be considered in any federal or state authorization of the use
of water from streams which traversed or abutted Indian
reservations. From a relative absence of concern at nonIndian use of these waters, some tribal representatives have
proceeded to the point of insisting that the waters could not
be used without tribal consent. At this point, conflict was
bound to develop.
Non-Indian developers of water, whether public or private, were inclined to the positions (1) that a Winters' Decree
right was for irrigation use, or should, at least, be so measured and (2) that absent such Indian use of the water, the
next senior appropriator could use the water without the
necessity of paying toll to the Indian interests. Indian representatives categorically denied the first postulate. In their
view Winters' Decree water could be used for any purpose
and not just for irrigation. As to the second postulate, at
least two groups of tribal attorneys took the position that
whether the Indians had use for the water or not, they were
entitled to control its disposition.
The non-Indian position that a Winters' Decree right
must be limited to a right of use for irrigation purposes
appears, at least initially, to have been premised on the fact
that in all cases involving the application of the Winters'
doctrine, the principal issue and decision related to the right
to use water for irrigation." However, a more substantial
premise for their position was provided with the development
of the federal reserved water doctrine and its most recent
enunciation in Arizona v. California." Under the principles
there provided, the character and magnitude of the reserved
water right would be determined in accordance with the
purpose for which the reservation of lands was made. If such
purpose were to enable the Indians to develop a viable agricultural economy, then the character and magnitude of the
water rights would be determined by agricultural and related
68.

The quantities of water required for domestic and livestock purposes were
small and doubtless would not warrant extended litigation. Even in United
States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939) the
propriety of allowing water for government power generation on the
reservation was not discussed and the allowance for government power
generation was lumped with the water allowed for domestic and stockwatering purposes.
69. 373 U.S. 546, at 601 (1963).
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requirements for water."0 The water right would then be
quantified by determining the amount of water needed to
serve the practically irrigable acreage on the reservation."
But the fact that the Winters' Decree water was to be
quantified in accordance with irrigation needs did not necessarily mean that such water could only be used for irrigation.
The Master in Arizona v. California carefully emphasized
that in fixing the measure of the Winters' Decree rights in
accordance with irrigation needs, he did not rule on whether
such rights might be used for other than irrigation purposes. 2
That a change in use would be allowed seems likely. Even
under state law, a change in use may be effected under
specified conditions.7"
Accordingly, it would appear that while Winters' Decree
rights may not necessarily be limited to use for irrigation
purposes, the quantification of those rights will normally be
geared to the amount of water needed for serving the practically irrigable lands of the Indian reservation."
Of course, we still have the question, "Practically irrigable as of what date?" When most of the Indian reservations were being established, there was little acreage that
could be practically irrigated by pumping water. Today, with
the development of new pumping efficiencies, and with the
70. The pertinent reasoning of the Master which the Supreme Court affirmed
in Arizona v. California, supra note 69, is set out on p. 265 of Special
Master Simon H. Rifkind's Report as follows:
The amount of water reserved for the five Reservations, and the
water rights created thereby, are measured by the water needed for
agricultural, stock and related domestic purposes. The reservations of
water were made for the purpose of enabling the Indians to develop
a viable agricultural economy; other uses, such as those for industry,
which might consume substantially more water than agricultural uses,
were not contemplated at the time the Reservations were created.
Indeed, the United States asks only for enough water to satisfy future
agricultural and related uses. This does not necessarily mean, however,
that water reserved for Indian Reservations may not be used for
purposes other than agricultural and related uses. The question of
change in the character of use is not before me. I hold only that the
amount of water reserved, and hence the magnitude of the water rights
created, is determined by agricultural and related requirements, since
when the water was reserved that was the purpose of the reservation.
71. Supra note 69, at 600.
72. See supra note 70.
73. MONT. REV. CODE § 89.803 (1947) ; S.D. CODE § 61.0129 (Supp. 1960); Wyo.
STAT. § 41.4 (1957).
74. 2 CLARK, upra note 57, § 141. Governmental agencies in the Missouri River
Basin, in determining the amount of water available for disposition in
drainageways of limited supply, appear generally to have reserved for
present and future Indian needs, at least as much water as prescribed in
Arizona.
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availability of cheap pumping power, 5 there are quantities
of land which, just a few years ago, were not considered
irrigable, but which are considered to be practically irrigable
today. And pumping efficiencies continue to increase.
If we follow the reasoning of Special Master Rifkind in
Arizona that the measure of the right must be taken as of the
date the right was reserved," then the acreage for which
water must be reserved would be the acreage irrigable on the
date the Indian reservation was established. However, this
rule was not meticulously applied in Arizona. Some acreage
was included which could not have been practically irrigated
in 1865 when the Colorado Indian reservations were established. But the time-of-irrigability issue appears not to have
been raised sufficiently to require a definitive ruling. Accordingly, the question appears to be one still to be resolved.
The non-Indian position that a Winters' Decree right
does not permit the owner of an Indian water right" to control the use of water which he himself does not use, seems
more difficult to challenge or qualify.
Nothing in the decisions suggests that an Indian water
right is more than a right of use, or that a claim can be made
to the corpus of the water until diversion or storage has been
accomplished. 8 In United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation
Dist.," the court observed:
Until the Indians were able to make use of the
waters there was no legal obstacle to the use of those
waters by the white settlers. And after the Indian
irrigation works were completed, there would still
be the right of non-Indian appropriators to make
use of any surplus available within the stream.
This view was reaffirmed in a subsequent hearing of the
case."0 Within the Missouri River Basin, the Ahtanum rule
75. Under the Missouri River Basin Project, Reclamation power for project
irrigation has been available at 22A mills per K.W.H.
76. See supra note 70, last sentence.
77. In United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1938) it was held that the purchaser of an Indian allotment acquired the Indian water right. As a matter
of interest, the trial court held that Winters' Decree rights were owned by
the individual Indians and not by the Indian Tribe. Id. nom. 16 F. Supp.
155, 160 (D. Mont. 1936). This finding, necessary to the basic decision in
the case, was not disturbed on appeal.
78. See Solicitor's Opinion M-36282 (Dept. Interior, May 5, 1955).
79. 236 F.2d 321, 335 (9th Cir. 1956); cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957).
80. United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 330 F.2d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1964).
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was most recently applied in Tweedy v. Texas Co.,"' where
the United States District Court for Montana stated that
"need and use are prerequisite to any water rights on Indian
reservations." The Montana Court held that this rule was
equally applicable to rights in underground waters.
If the appropriator next senior to the Indian water right
may freely take water which the owner of the Indian water
right does not choose to use, or which is otherwise surplus
in the stream, it is difficult to conceive of any legal basis
upon which the owner of the Indian right could control or
levy toll on non-Indian use of such water. In these circumstances, the right of the next senior appropriator, particularly
if such appropriator were the United States proceeding under
the Commerce clause,82 would seem to be unassailable."
A final area in which interesting questions have developed
in the Missouri River Basin relate to Indian claims to the
ownership of the beds of navigable waters. In United States
v. Holt State Bank,8 4 it was held that the State of Minnesota,
upon its admission into the Union, became the owner of the
bed of a navigable waterway (Mud Lake) lying wholly within
the Red Lake Indian Reservation. The Court emphasized
that the Act of Admissions" declared that navigable waters
" 'shall be common highways, and forever free, . . . ' , In
81. 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968).
82. See United States v. 531.13 Acres of Land, Etc., 366 F.2d 915, 921 (4th Cir.
1966) which again affirms the language of the New River Case (supra note
1, at 426) that "Flood protection, watershed development, recovery of the
cost of improvements through utilization of power are likewise parts of
commerce control."
83. In 2 CLAicK, supra note 57, at 394, Mr. Clyde observes:
Since the power to control interstate commerce is vested by the
Constitution in Congress as one of its sovereign, as distinguished from
proprietary, powers, it is logical to hold that the rights of the Indians
to the use of navigable waters are subject to the sovereign powers of
Congress, and that the implied reservation by Congress of the water
for the Indians does not deprive Congress of its powers over navigable
waters or of any of its other sovereign powers.
It is also interesting to note that in the Missouri River Basin, under the
Act of March 3, 1811, supra note 22, Congress dedicated the navigable
waters of the Basin to public use long before any treaty, Congressional Act
or Executive Order could be said to have reserved an Indian right in such
waters.
84. 270 U.S. 49 (1925).
85. Id. at 58.
86. Act of February 26, 1857, 11 Stat. 166.
87. United States v. Holt State Bank, supra note 84, at 59. In Section 12 of
the Act of March 3, 1811 (2 Stat. 662, 666) Congress had used much the
same language with respect to all navigable waters within the Louisiana
Purchase, of which the Missouri River Basin was a principal part.
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denying that the earlier Indian land cession treaties served
to reserve an Indian right in the beds of navigable waterways,
the court said:
There was no formal setting apart of what was not
ceded, nor any affirmative declaration of the rights
of the Indians therein, nor any attempted exclusion
of others from the use of navigable waters.
In two succeeding cases decided by the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals, the court found reason to recognize Indian title in
the beds of navigable waters which were wholly or partly
within the Indian reservation. In Montana Power Co. v.
8 the court concluded that the bed of the south
Rochester,"
half of Flathead Lake, which lay within the boundaries of
the Flathead Indian Reservation in Montana, was reserved to
the Indians under the Hell Gate Treaty of 1855." 9 While the
court did not refer to Holt, it emphasized that the south half
of Flathead Lake was within the reservation set apart for
the exclusive use and benefit of the tribes. 1o At least one legal
scholar makes a strong showing that this conclusion is directly
in conflict with Holt.9 But the ruling continues unmodified
and was recently cited as authority for dismissing an action
in which the United States, as Trustee for the Flathead
Indians, had not been named as a party."
In Moore v. United States," the court, in affirming
Indian ownership in the bed of a navigable water, emphasized
that the Quillayute Treaty provided for a reservation sufficient for the wants of the Indians who as early as 1889 had
whaling, seal and salmon enterprises under way. 4 The court
distinguished Holt on the ground that no evidence was there
adduced as to "the use of navigable waters with reference to
established industries of the Indians." 5
While Rochester and Moore might have suggested a lessening of the impact of Holt, a recent decision of the Ninth
88. 127 F.2d 189 (9th Cir. 1942).
89. This treaty was with the Confederated Tribes of the Flathead, Kootenay
and Upper Pend d'Oreilles Indians and was ratified by the Act of April
18, 1859 (12 Stat. 975).
90. Supra note 88, at 190.
91. Note, Access and Wharfage Rights and the Territorial Extent of Indian
Reservations Bordering on Navigable Water-Who Owns the Bed of Flathead Lake? 27 MONT. L. REV. 55 (1965).
92. Seifert v. Udall, 280 F. Supp. 443 (D. Mont. 1968).
93. 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1946).
94. Id. at 762.
95. Id. at 765.
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Circuit Court has served to reaffirm its principles. In Skokomish Indian Tribe v. FranceJ the court emphasized an
absence of intent on the part of the treaty makers to include
tidelands in the Skokomish Reservation. The court distinguished Moore by noting that the Skokomish Indians, as
contrasted with the Quillayutes, had made no showing that
the tidelands were essential to their livelihood. 7
From the foregoing, it seems plain that no single rule
will determine whether the bed of a navigable water within
an Indian reservation belongs to the State or to the Tribe.
The language and the purpose of the treaty setting up the
Indian reservation, the wants and industries of the Indians
and their established use of the navigable water will all have
some bearing on the determination of ownership.
One thing indicated by the cited cases, and particularly
Skokomish, is that the courts do not favor a dog-in-the-manger
position. Where there are two claimants to a property, the
one who can or does best use it may very possibly prevail.
Interestingly enough the question of the ownership of
the beds of navigable waters within Indian reservations has
most frequently been raised in connection with the fishing
rights of non-Indians. Under the Act of July 12, 1960,98
hunting or fishing on Indian tribal or allotted lands without
permission is made a federal offense. If the beds of the
navigable waterways are owned by an Indian tribe, it would
appear that one who fishes on or over these lands should be
obliged to secure a tribal fishing permit." However, this
conclusion appears subject to qualification. In Tlingit and
Haida Indians of Alaska v. United States,"' the Court of
Claims reviewed the decisions on Indian fishing rights and
concluded (1) that no citizen has any exclusive right to the
fish in navigable waters and has no right to exclude any
other citizen from an equal opportunity to exercise his right
to the possession of such fish ;101 (2) that the Indians did not
possess exclusive aboriginal fishing rights in navigable
320 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1963); cert. denied, 376 U.S. 943 (1964).
Id. at 212.
18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1964); Pub. L. No. 86-634, 74 Stat. 469.
On some reservations tribal fishing permits have been an important source
of tribal income.
100. 389 F.2d 778 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
101. Id. at 785.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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waters ;..2 and (3) that a tribal right to exclude non-Indians
from fishing in navigable waters can only be exercised if the
grant of the Indian reservation included, as part of the grant,
the right to fish in designated areas free from interference."'
In such circumstances, it would appear that even where the
tribe has been held to own the bed of a navigable waterway,
a non-Indian might reasonably urge that he could not be
obliged to secure a tribal permit to fish thereon unless the
Congress had granted tribal members an exclusive right to
fish thereon. Admittedly, a definitive decision on the application of the Act of July 12, 1960 ' 04 to navigable waterways
has not yet been provided. However, since the Act contains
criminal sanctions which cannot be casually applied, the Act's
availability to control a citizen's fishing rights on navigable
waters within an Indian reservation may be open to
question.'05
THE Quo VADIMUS
This article obviously has been primarily concerned with
navigability in the Missouri River Basin west of the 98th
Meridian. In this area, state and federal conflicts appear to
have been reasonably contained by the machinery provided
in the Flood Control Act of December 22, 1944.10' Where
conflict has intermittently emerged, it seems largely to have
been occasioned by the size of the federal project. Any program designed to harness and comprehensively use the largest
continuous waterway in the world, must necessarily require
federal activity that seems at times to pre-empt or interfere
with state and local activities. In such situations, the utmost
in restraint is required on both sides. Intransigence can halt
a program, no matter how desirable the program may be. If
the hardheadedness can be minimized, comprehensive water
resource development can make the Basin a very pleasant and
secure place in which to live.
With respect to Indian rights, these must be carefully
guarded. But they must be adequately defined and quantified
so that investment in general resource development can safely
proceed.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 786.
Id. at 785.
Supra note 98.
See supra note 23.
58 Stat. 887.
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